Health Care Reform and the Constitutional Limits on Private Accreditation as an Alternative to Direct Government Regulation by Astrue, Michael J.
HEALTH CARE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PRIVATE
ACCREDITATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE.
TO DIRECT GOVERNMENT
REGULATION
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE*
I
INTRODUCTION
My goals are modest. First, I will draw upon my personal experience during
six-and-a-half years at the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
to make a few cultural observations about the agency in an effort to suggest
why different parts of it approach private accreditation in different ways.
Second, I will discuss some of the possible limitations on the use of private
accreditation in the health care area, including the private delegation doctrine,
a dormant area of constitutional law so treacherous that it seems to have appeal
to both former Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Rehnquist as a vehicle for
judicial activism.
II
THE CULTURE OF FEDERAL HEALTH CARE REGULATORS
Anyone familiar with federal regulation of health care comes to realize that
HHS is not an entity with a distinct institutional culture, but rather a loose
collection of subagencies with strong and divergent cultures. To understand the
Health Care Financing Agency ("HCFA"), it is necessary to understand that it
is the offspring of the Social Security Administration and its predecessor
agencies, the Social Security Board and the Federal Security Administration.'
Put simply, HCFA has viewed itself as a check-writing agency whose missions
are to determine when people can receive money for doing something and then
to pay that money when they do it. Historically, it has not viewed itself as a
regulatory agency and has resisted legislative efforts to transform it into one.
This attitude has been a constant among the senior civil servants, who
stubbornly adhere to it regardless of the ideological inclinations of the political
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appointees who pass through the agency under the mistaken impression that
they are really in charge.
Despite its strong feelings, HCFA has been slowly losing this battle. It
began with incremental "back-door regulation" as Congress added what are
known as the "conditions of participation" for Medicare. In other words, while
Congress did not enact statutes directing HCFA to regulate the health and
safety of hospitals and nursing homes, it did direct the agency not to reimburse
them if they did not satisfy the increasingly broad requirements of the
"conditions of participation."2 As participation in Medicare has become an
economic necessity for providers, the distinction between standard command-
and-control regulation and this form of "carrot-and-stick" regulation has become
largely a matter of semantics. Whether it be the patient dumping statute3 or
the nursing home reform legislation,4 HCFA's predictable institutional response
has been to resist additional regulatory responsibility. When it has received new
authorities, usually over its objection, it has tended to assign the new task a low
priority.
It is for this reason that the HHS Office of the Inspector General (the
"OIG") has evolved in a way unlike the inspectors general of other agencies.
In all or virtually all other federal agencies, the inspectors general operate
pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 19785 and tend to oversee a
comparatively small operation primarily focused on internal waste, fraud, and
abuse.
At HHS, however, the OIG employs more than 1500 people, a number
greater than the total number of employees at many substantial federal
agencies. Pursuant to special authorities,6 it prosecutes Medicare and Medicaid
waste, fraud, and abuse in the health care industry on behalf of the entire
agency. These special delegations must be viewed in part as a congressional
recognition that HCFA could not be cajoled into playing this role for itself.
This self-image as a nonregulatory agency is so strong that HCFA overcame
the natural inclination of agencies to expand their jurisdiction and fiercely
resisted being assigned the regulatory responsibility for the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments of 1988.' HCFA was strongly opposed to taking
on the responsibility of regulating perhaps as many as 600,000 laboratories and
argued internally that the Food and Drug Administration (the "FDA") would
better handle this responsibility.
It is instructive to observe that the FDA would have eagerly taken on this
responsibility. To understand this difference in mentality, one must understand
2. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1988). See also id. §§ 1395w-2, 1395x(o)(6), 1395x(cc)(2)(I),
1395z, 1395aa, 1395bb, 1396a.
3. Id. § 1395dd.
4. Id. § 1396r.
5. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-12.
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (establishing criminal penalties for acts involving Medicare or
state health care programs).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 201 note.
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that the FDA's self-image is generally one of a consumer protection agency,
more akin to the Federal Trade Commission than to HCFA or the rest of HHS.
Accordingly, it invariably sees expansion of its jurisdiction as increasing its
protection of the public and therefore desirable. Thus, in the past few years the
FDA has waged war with the Department of Agriculture to assert its
jurisdiction over the regulation of seafood at the same time that it was pleading
poverty, as the excuse for its failure to perform some of its most important
functions, such as the approval of new drugs.' Similarly, even when Congress,
in large part due to its own jurisdictional imperatives, assigned regulatory
responsibility for regulation of clinical laboratories to HCFA, the FDA
immediately embarked on an expansive new reinterpretation of its authority to
regulate devices, submitting clinical laboratories to a confusing and unnecessary
regime of dual regulation.9
Given these differences in self-image, it is unsurprising that HCFA has
attempted to minimize its role as regulator through liberal use of private
contractors and private accrediting agencies. Most HCFA payments made to
providers are actually made by private insurance companies, and, with the
exception of a small number of national coverage decisions made by HCFA,
these contractors actually make most of the important coverage decisions.
HCFA has likewise been receptive to the use of private accrediting agencies.
It has for some time relied upon the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (the "JCAHO") ° to certify that a hospital or
managed care provider has complied with HCFA's conditions of participation
relating to health and safety. HCFA has also relied upon nonprofit peer review
organizations to make the initial judgments with regard to most quality of care
issues. Recent regulations, originally proposed in 1990, have expanded HCFA's
use of private accrediting bodies and, for the first time, set up a degree of
competition among accrediting agencies.l
Although the FDA occasionally incorporates commonly used scientific
standards by reference, 2 it is typically adamantly opposed to any delegation
of its rulemaking or operational authorities, because it views such delegations
as an abdication of its mission. For example, the FDA bitterly opposed certain
features of the Competitiveness Council's November 1991 plan to accelerate the
8. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
9. Clinical Reference Lab., Inc. v. Sullivan, 791 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Kan. 1992).
10. The Joint Commission changed its name from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals in 1987 to reflect the growing diversity of health care options. JOINT COMM'N ON
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMMITTED TO QUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 14 (1990).
11. 58 Fed. Reg. 61,816 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401, 488, 489); 55 Fed. Reg. 51,434
(1990) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 488.9).
12. Notable among these are those taken from the Pharmacopeia. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 73.1015(c)
(1993) (color additives exempt from certification); id. § 106.20(a) (infant formula quality control
procedures); id. § 310.500(b)(2)(i) (new drugs for human use); id. § 878.5010(a) (general and plastic
surgery devices).
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approval of new drug applications because the plan proposed to remove
regulatory responsibility from the Agency and delegate it to university scientists.
Therefore, because of the fundamentally different views of their missions, the
various subagencies of HHS, exemplified by HCFA and the FDA, are likely to
take opposing positions on the use of private accreditation in health care
regulation.
III
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO PRIVATE ACCREDITATION
To devise his health care reform plan, President Clinton convened a body
of more than five hundred advisers whose identities and work he attempted to
hide from public scrutiny, until he was forced to accept the proverbial "sunshine
in government" by a federal district court judge.13 At least part of his
rationale for this secrecy was that his advisers could not make hard decisions if
all the parties interested in the process could attempt to influence the
decisionmakers. Some now argue that this model should be extended to the
plan itself, with groups of essentially private citizens making many critical
decisions concerning health care. Certainly it appears that many of these
decisions-including perhaps the definition of the basic benefits package to be
offered by plans certified as qualified to participate in the new "managed
competition" structure-will be made at the state or local level by a health
insurance purchasing cooperative. The definition of such a cooperative is still
very much up for grabs, and it is certainly possible that it will organizationally
resemble traditional accrediting organizations such as the JCAHO.
Those enamored of the use of private organizations to help administer
federal health programs may want to consider Justice Scalia's 1989 dissent in
Mistretta v. United States, in which he declared:
I foresee all manner of "expert" bodies, insulated from the political process, to which
Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How tempting
to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.'s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.'s
in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, "no-win" political issues as the
withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal
tissue for research. This is an undemocratic precedent that we set-not because of the
scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the three
Branches of Government.14
Justice Scalia seems to endorse reviving an obscure constitutional doctrine that
holds that the federal government may not delegate its powers to private
citizens.
This effort may appear to be a lonely, even quixotic, quest for Justice Scalia.
After all, the Supreme Court last employed this private delegation doctrine in
13. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 813 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 997
F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
14. 488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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1936 in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., a decision relying on one of the most
abused cases of this century, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.1 6
If these facts did not make the demise of the private delegation doctrine clear
enough for most people, Justice Marshall declared in a 1974 opinion without
objection from his peers that the doctrine "has been virtually abandoned by the
Court for all practical purposes."'1
Nevertheless, diverse individuals have found merit in the doctrine in diverse
circumstances. Former Justice Brennan proposed revival of the doctrine in his
dissent in McGautha v. California.8 Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring
opinion, also advocated a revival of the doctrine in an Occupational Safety and
Health Administration case, Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute9 Former Chief Justice Burger joined in a similar dissenting opinion
with Justice Rehnquist in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Dono-
van.2" In another intriguing case, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,2 Professor
Lawrence Tribe argued that the Court should affirm the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit's invalidation of a local zoning ordinance on the
grounds that it constituted an unconstitutional delegation to a private party.22
In Larkin, the Supreme Court silently sidestepped the First Circuit's holding and
affirmed the decision on other grounds, although the Court did hold that
delegation of zoning authority to a church violated the Establishment Clause.
Litigants have attempted to strike down the use of private organizations to
develop and enforce standards of care under public programs. In Cospito v.
Heckler,' patients in a psychiatric hospital challenged their hospital's loss of
accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals ("JCAH")
and its decertification for federal funding by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare ("HEW"). A divided court of appeals ignored the plain
language of 42 U.S.C. section 1396d(h)(1)(A), which defined inpatient
psychiatric hospital services as "inpatient services which are provided in an
institution which is accredited as a psychiatric hospital by the [JCAH]" '24 and
concluded that "no real authority was actually vested in JCAH."'  In a
15. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
16. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
17. Federal Power Comm'n v. New Eng. Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). See text accompanying notes 37-71 infra.
18. 402 U.S. 183,272 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting), vacated sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S.
941 (1972).
19. 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
20. 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
21. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
22. Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1981), afJ'd sub nom. Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
23. 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
24. Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 299B(b), 92 Stat. 1548, 1709-10, was amended on July 18, 1984 to read
"inpatient services which are provided in an institution (or distinct part thereof) which is a psychiatric
hospital as defined in section 1895x(f) ...." Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2340(b), 98 Stat. 494, 1093 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(h)(1)(A) (1988)).
25. Cospito, 742 F.2d at 89 n.29.
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muddled and tortuous opinion, the majority somehow found that this short and
direct delegation to the JCAH included "an articulation of congressional policy
sufficient to safeguard against unbridled administrative discretion."26 It also
discussed at length the difficulty of requiring Congress to articulate technical
standards,27 sliding over the fact that Congress has traditionally delegated such
tasks to agencies, not private organizations.
In a more articulate rejection of a similar argument, a three-judge district
court panel in Association of American Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger28
rejected a series of constitutional challenges to a statute requiring the Secretary
of HEW to incorporate private professional standards review organizations
("PSROs") 29 into the process for denying reimbursement to providers because
the services for which payment was claimed were "medically unnecessary."30
The court held that the presence of an administrative hearing mechanism to
appeal the decisions of the PSRO provided enough control over the PSRO to
eliminate any constitutional concerns.3 In Corum v. Beth Israel Medical
Center,32 the district court also gave short shrift to the delegation argument,
holding that it was not unconstitutional for Congress to give veto power over
the Secretary of HEW's rulemaking authority to a now-defunct body called "the
Federal Hospital Council."33
Although the private delegation doctrine has displayed more hardiness in
health care cases in the state courts,' it has not shown any readily apparent
26. Id. at 87.
27. Id. at 87 n.24.
28. 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.), affd sub nom. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v.
Mathews, 423 U.S. 975 (1975).
29. A PSRO
(1) is composed of a substantial number of the licensed doctors of medicine and osteopathy
engaged in the practice of medicine or surgery in the area and who are representative of the
practicing physicians in the area ... or has available to it the services [of such doctors] to
assure that adequate peer review of the services provided by the various medical specialties
and subspecialties can be assured;
(2) is able ... to perform review functions. . . in a manner consistent with the efficient and
effective administration of this part ... and to perform reviews of the pattern of quality of
care in an area of medical practice where actual performance is measured against objective
criteria which define acceptable and adequate practice; and
(3) has at least one individual who is a representative of consumers on it governing body.
Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1430 (1972). Under Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 143, 96 Stat. 324,
382 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (1988)), the PSROs are now named peer review
organizations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 to 1320c-13 (1988).
30. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. at 130.
31. Id. at 140-41.
32. 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
33. Id. at 551-53; cf. United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939).
34. See Ware v. Benedikt, 280 S.W.2d 234 (Ark. 1955) (invalidating delegation of licensing power
to county medical society); Rogers v. Medical Ass'n of Ga., 259 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 1979) (invalidating
appointment to state Board of Examiners of only those individuals recommended by the private
Medical Association of Georgia); Toussaint v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 329 S.E.2d 433 (S.C.
1985) (holding invalid legislation mandating that governor only appoint members of private
organizations to State Board of Medical Examiners); cf. Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 994-95 (D.
Kan. 1972) (three-judge court) (holding that Kansas law prohibits delegation of power to promulgate
binding standards to private individuals such as member of JCAH); see also Harold J. Krent,
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life in recent federal health care cases. This situation is likely to change in the
coming years, however, for the following reasons: (1) health care reform will
involve a massive amount of new effort, particularly at the already overloaded
state level, and government agencies-out of necessity if not ideology-will be
looking for as many ways as possible to delegate functions to the private sector;
(2) the decisions delegated to the private sector, as predicted by Justice Scalia,
will involve some of the more sensitive decisions in our lives and thus, as a
matter of human nature if not as a result of consistent theories of judicial
review, will receive a higher level of scrutiny than regulations that determine the
maturity of an avocado based upon its oil content35 or rules that are intended
to stabilize the production of bituminous coal;' and (3) the underpinnings of
the doctrine of private delegation are mutating in ways that will give the
doctrine, or a renamed successor, new vibrancy.
The private delegation cases from the twenties and thirties were based on
a strong conception of separation of powers.37  For example, in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp., the Court stated:
We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting legislation to complex
conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal
directly.... [Tihe Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its
function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the
determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply....
[T]he constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the
wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them,
cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our
constitutional system is to be maintained.'
The Court went on to state that "Congress cannot delegate legislative power to
the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he
thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade
or industry."39 The Court strengthened its position on delegation in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co. In striking down the provisions of the Bituminous Coal
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the
Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 110 n.176 (1990).
35. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
36. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
37. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that "excise tax" affecting
working conditions is not part of the congressional power to regulate commerce, but is reserved to the
states); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that the federal
government cannot regulate the wages and hours of persons employed in the internal commerce of a
state); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding that § 9(c) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act was void because Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President);
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (holding that zoning
measures must find their justification in the police power exerted in the public interest and
unreasonable restrictions may not be imposed on private property); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226
U.S. 137 (1912) (holding that a municipal ordinance requiring the authorities to establish building lines
on separate blocks and across private property was not a valid exercise of police power).
38. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529-30 (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 537-38 (citation omitted).
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Conservation Act of 1935, which delegated the power to fix maximum labor
hours and minimum wages to some producers and miners, the Court categorical-
ly stated that "a statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an
intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private
property."'
As it became clear to the Court that this purist conception of separation of
powers was standing in the way of the New Deal, this conception and the
doctrines it spawned were scrapped without a great deal of ceremony or
analysis. Within the space of only a few years, the Court suddenly found that
delegations to private parties presented no issues worth discussing at all.41 In
Currin v. Wallace, only three years after Carter Coal, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a provision of the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935 which
allowed tobacco growers to prevent the Secretary of Agriculture from inspecting
their tobacco prior to sale.42 Dramatically reversing course, the Court held
that there was no unconstitutional delegation of power because "Congress ha[d]
merely placed a restriction upon its own regulation by withholding its operation
as to a given market 'unless two-thirds of the growers voting favor it."' 43 The
fact that it was ultimately up to the growers whether they would be subject to
regulation was blithely side-stepped by the Court in distinguishing the case from
anti-delegation cases such as Carter Coal.'
If revitalization of the private delegation doctrine relied on a revival of a
purist conception of separation of powers, then we could probably write it off
for good. After all, we live in an era in which prosecutors appointed by federal
judges can prosecute executive branch officials for "conspiracy" to violate
congressional appropriations riders.45 However, wholesale delegations, at least
in some instances, still bother us intuitively. Imagine, for instance, a health care
system that permits the local medical association to determine the criteria for
providing expensive treatments to high-risk patients, a not preposterous result
based on some of the current debate. Imagine also that a physician informs you
that he will not be able to provide a member of your family with potentially
life-saving treatment because he or she did not satisfy the local association's
guidelines for treatment, which are based in part on the expense of treatment.
40. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
41. See, e.g. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (Bituminous Coal Act
of 1947 a valid delegation of power despite ability of coal producers to propose minimum prices);
United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939) (Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 not
an unconstitutional delegation despite producers' referendum since "Congress had the power to put the
Order into effect without the approval of anyone"); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (Tobacco
Inspection Act including growers referendum not an unconstitutional delegation because "Congress has
merely placed a resstriction upont its own regulation"); Shields v. Utah Id. Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177
(1938) (Railway Labor Act not an unconstitutional delegation despite Interstate Commerce
Commission's power to designate "interurban" railways).
42. 306 U.S. at 5-8.
43. Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
44. See id. at 15-16.
45. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991). See
generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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Imagine further that you have heard of similarly situated but better connected
persons who have received treatment despite the guidelines. Such an experience
would cause many of us to begin damning the tyranny of the unelected and the
self-interested.
There are signs that these types of issues will continue to bother the
Supreme Court despite the occasional blanket statement about the death of the
private delegation doctrine. Cynics might claim that this response would mark
an ideological distaste for privatization by a judiciary certain to become much
more liberal in the next few years. In fairness, however, we as a nation have
become increasingly hostile to long-tolerated "conflicts of interest" to the point
where the Clinton Administration has felt obliged to disqualify virtually anyone
with hands-on experience in health care from its task force on health care
reform, leaving a group consisting almost exclusively of civil servants,
congressional staff, political appointees, and a few academics.'
This heightened sensitivity takes many forms, from increasingly onerous
"ethics" laws that have nothing to do with ethics to the National Institute of
Health's proposal to regulate the financial holdings of university researchers
even though it lacks the statutory authority to do so. Perhaps the most
instructive example of this heightened sensitivity is Melashenko v. Bowen,47 one
of the few decisions which the HHS OIG has ever lost. The plaintiff, Dr.
Melashenko, was excluded from participating in the Medicare program by the
OIG.' Melashenko charged, inter alia, that the OIG decisionmaker, Patton,
was biased, because Patton received what HHS referred to as "merit pay"; the
court referred to it as a "bounty" based on the number of sanctions he
imposed.' The district court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Withrow
v. Larkin'" in holding that the bounty system deprived Melashenko of due
process because of Patton's pecuniary interest.51
The Supreme Court has, in the context of the Medicare program, treated
similar types of delegation issues as due process issues. In Schweiker v.
McClure,52 three claimants who were denied reimbursement for Part B
Medicare expenses challenged the ruling of the hearing officer, who was chosen
by the insurance carrier. The Court unanimously held that due process is served
where (1) the hearing officers are paid out of federal, as opposed to carrier,
funds, 53 (2) the carriers operate under contracts that require compliance with
46. This attitude is particularly remarkable since the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1-15 (1988), presupposes that federal agencies need the advice of those whose interests they are
proposing to affect.
47. No. CV-F-87-533, 1990 WL 159905 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 1990).
48. Id. at *1.
49. Id. at *4.
50. 421 U.S. 35 (1975) "[Where the decisionmaker has a pecuniary interest,] the probability of
actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Id.
at 47.
51. Melashenko, 1990 WL 159905, at *4.
52. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
53. Id. at 196-97.
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the standards set forth by statute and the Secretary of HHS, 4 and (3) the
hearing officer has a thorough knowledge of the Medicare program."5 What
I expect to see are fewer conclusory statements that a private delegation is
permissible, and a more detailed and unpredictable inquiry into the ,"fairness"
of the delegation. As in Melashenko; courts will focus on the structure of the
economic interests as they relate to standard setting and enforcement.
A second recasting of the private delegation doctrine may occur due to the
partial vitality of the Appointments Clause. In the past ten years, the Court has
made it clear that it is more sympathetic to separation of powers arguments
when they are based on the Appointments Clause, rather than on the general
scheme establishing three branches of government. In Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,56 Congress delegated its power to suspend
the deportation of aliens in certain situations to the Attorney General, but
reserved the right for either house to veto any exercise of that delegated
power. 7 When the House, of Representatives vetoed the Attorney General's
suspension of deportation proceedings against Chadha, the Court stated that the
legislative veto "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties,
and relations of persons, - including the Attorney General, Executive Branch
officials and Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch."5" Three years later,
in Bowsher v. Synar,59 the Court held that the reporting provision of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act' was unconstitutional because it put executive
power into the hands .of the Comptroller General, who served at the pleasure
of Congress and was, therefore, deemed to be a legislative agent. 1
A similar argument HHS made with the Department of Justice provoked
Congress to amend the authorization for the Medicare Geographic Classification
Review Board, which had originally purported to prevent the Secretary of HHS
from intervening in the decisions of lesser officers of his agency. The end result
is that in this small area, despite the general eclipse of separation-of-powers
jurisprudence, explicit limitations on an agency head's authority to issue rules
still raise issues that concern the Supreme Court. Accordingly, cases such as
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center62 might well be decided differently in the
future.
One reason why this area is certain to be complicated is that it is impossible
in practice to separate standard setting from the operational enforcement of
standards. While the JCAHO may seem like a straightforward model, in most
instances the rulemaking and operational roles of the private organization
54. Id. at 197.
55. Id. at 199.
56. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
57. Id. at 923-25.
58. Id. at 952.
59. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
60. 2 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
61. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733-34.
62. 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (discussed supra at notes 32-33).
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cannot be neatly severed. For instance, part of the reason the FDA was so
concerned about the Competitiveness Council's private review proposal is that
it would permit outsiders to develop rules at the core of the FDA's authority.
Despite its critical importance to the regulation of drugs, the FDA has never
articulated much in -the way of regulatory interpretations of the "safe and
effective" standard and relies on ad hoc standards. For instance, it has never
been clear why Accutane, an acne drug with severe side effects, presented "only
a labeling issue," whereas Tacrin, a drug that offered small benefits to persons
with Alzheimer's but also caused side effects, did not involve "a labeling issue"
and, therefore, could not be approved, at least until a recent agency change of
heart.
This point can be underlined by examining the debate of and subsequent
controversy over the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984,' which was
amended in 1 98 8 ' and 1990.65 This statute conditioned the receipt of
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement upon a hospital's membership in a
nonprofit organization called the United Network of Organ Sharing ("UNOS").
It also purported to require hospitals performing organ transplants to abide by
the rules of this organization in order to continue to receive reimbursement. At
the time of the 1988 debate over the Act, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
continued a lonely, if not quixotic, battle against the Act by arguing that the
statutory scheme constituted a delegation of regulatory authority to private
parties and a violation of due process.' Few observers paid much attention
to Senator Hatch's arguments, and fewer were impressed by them. But recently,
it has become clearer that Senator Hatch was not engaging in arcane self-
indulgence.
On, April 1, 1993, the Wall Street Journal reported on the subsequent
development of the program.67 In 1991, a UNOS committee of twelve
transplant surgeons eliminated the emergency classification in its rules, which
had the effect of taking livers away from the premiere transplant centers, such
as the University of Pittsburgh, and spreading them more evenly around the
country. The article suggested that this change meant that more livers were
being wasted, lower success rates were being tolerated, and a class of hospitals
well represented by the UNOS committee was profiting. It then put a human
face on this debate by detailing the long, agonizing decline of a man named Rex
Voss, who died waiting for a liver under the new system.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74.
64. Pub. L. No. 100-607, §§ 401-408, 102 Stat. 3048,3114-20 (1988) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274
(Supp. V 1993)).
65. Pub. L. No. 101-616, §§ 201-207, 104 Stat. 3279,3283-86 (1990) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274
(Supp. V 1993)).
66. 134 CONG. REC. S8089 (daily ed. June 17, 1988).
67. Scott McCartney, Agonizing Choices, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1993, at Al.
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The General Accounting Office has also recently issued a report that has
detailed some of the problems with UNOS.' HHS has taken the position that
UNOS lacks authority to issue rules and requirements that control Medicare
reimbursement, and has declared in notice-and-comment rulemaking that UNOS
rules are voluntary unless approved by the Secretary.6 Despite the uncertainty
about the regulatory framework, most centers apparently have complied with
most UNOS rules.7°
Nonetheless, the overall result has been disturbing. Policies are inconsistent
around the country, many policies may be racially discriminatory, and, in many
cases, institutional access to a prestigious and lucrative area of practice has been
given priority over maximization of the survival of individuals.71
IV
CONCLUSION
In the coming years, this nation will be making many hard choices about
how to make hard choices. In Congress and in the health care industry, there
is widespread disenchantment with the traditional agency model of notice-and-
comment rulemaking. While it is undeniable that HCFA, the FDA, and other
agencies have done much in their own ways to deserve a reputation for being
sluggish and unresponsive, it is also true that Congress has responded almost
every year to budgetary and political pressures by demanding an enormously
complex regulatory product on short notice with a decreasing administrative
budget and many staffing and procedural constraints.
If Congress looks to abandon the traditional agency model and delegate
substantial new standard setting and enforcement to private organizations, it
must try to sail between the proverbial Scylla and Charybdis. It can try to
identify-or, as was the case with PSROs, attempt to create-organizations
where the economic interests of those administering the organizations are either
separate from the industry they are regulating or are sufficiently diffused so that
conflict-of-interest concerns are minimal. It is, however, hard to find or
manufacture such groups, and it is often fair to ask whether the group in
question has the type of expertise necessary to regulate in a sensible fashion.
On the other hand, if Congress looks to find the groups that have the most
expertise in the area being regulated, the legitimacy of their decisionmaking will
undoubtedly be called into question, and the Supreme Court will probably
reflect society's heightened concern about conflicts of interest. Even if the
lonely campaigns by Justice Scalia, Senator Hatch, and others for the return of
the classical private delegation doctrine do not produce a change in judicial
68. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: INCREASED EFFORT NEEDED TO
BOOST SUPPLY AND ENSURE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS (1993).
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 28 ("HHS has acknowledged.., that when OPOs use transplant-center specific lists some
patients with a higher priority may not be considered for an organ.").
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approaches, the same sorts of issues will almost surely return under the guise of
the Due Process Clause, the Appointments Clause, or other more fashionable
lines of constitutional argument.

